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ABSTRACT 
Linguistic deception theory provides methods to discover potentially deceptive texts to make 
them accessible to clerical review.  This paper proposes the integration of these linguistic 
methods with traditional e-discovery techniques to identify deceptive texts within a given 
author’s larger body of written work, such as their sent email box. First, a set of linguistic 
features associated with deception are identified and a prototype classifier is constructed to 
analyze texts and describe the features’ distributions, while avoiding topic-specific features to 
improve recall of relevant documents. The tool is then applied to a portion of the Enron Email 
Dataset to illustrate how these strategies identify records, providing an example of its 
advantages and capability to stratify the large data set at hand.  
Keywords: e-discovery, deception detection, anomaly detection, forensic linguistics, natural 
language processing  
1.    INTRODUCTION 
The field of electronic discovery (e-discovery), 
which concerns itself with practices for 
identifying electronic evidence relevant to 
investigations or litigation, faces a variety of 
challenges, ranging from data sets which 
exponentially increase in size and complexity 
to aging text processing techniques that some 
have gone so far as to call “primitive” (Kroll 
Ontrack, 2013; Oard & Webber, 2013). 
Contemporary data sets are so large that 
processing by having a human review and 
categorize them is prohibitively expensive 
(Tingen, 2012). In order to more accurately 
and efficiently process these data, legal teams 
and courts need to be aware of what advanced 
technologies are available, how best to employ 
them and what their limitations are (Tingen, 
2012). In addition, they must be prepared to 
defend their chosen course of action and 
justify its use (Kroll Ontrack, 2013; Tingen, 
2012). Linguistic methods can provide 
theoretically rich, empirically valid methods 
to help support these decisions.   
This paper explains how a linguistic text 
classifier can serve as an advanced search 
technique and how it may be used to detect 
records which are more likely to contain 
deceptive information. The proposed classifier 
benefits from theories of linguistic deception 
and techniques shown to identify relevant 
features, providing a tool which is cost 
effective and informative to improve search 
results. This linguistically-based approach is 
fundamentally different from many current 
search technologies because it draws attention 
and focus to an author’s linguistic style, 
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rather than relying on the words he or she 
uses. After all, the words found in an email 
may be misleading (Baron et al., 2007); for 
example, rather than intending a literal 
interpretation, an author may intend to 
communicate sarcasm or be making an 
allusion.  In order to circumvent these issues, 
this paper provides a framework for 
summarizing language patterns and discourse 
quality within each example of an author’s 
work, and then comparing them to find the 
most suspect texts. Section 2 will summarize 
the challenges and methods current in the e-
discovery field as documented by recent 
survey works. Section 3 will address linguistic 
techniques for deception detection and detail 
how they are relevant to e-discovery. In 
section 4, I shall discuss preliminary results 
obtained from a proof-of-concept model 
exploring one author’s email collection from 
the Enron Email Data Set (EDRM, LLC, 
2014). Finally, section 5 concludes the paper 
with suggestions for further research.  
2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
As noted by Tingen (2012) and Belt, Kiker, 
and Shetterly (2012), some within the legal 
field have resisted adopting new technology 
for e-discovery efforts. Although some 
members of the legal profession have defended 
manual review, this is a time-consuming and 
expensive process, costing up to five hundred 
dollars an hour for review (Tingen, 2012). 
However, despite the price and time required 
for human review, previous studies such as 
Grossman and Cormack (2011) have shown 
that technology-assisted review not only 
requires less effort, but produces more 
accurate results.  However, while the promise 
of reducing effort on the part of law firms 
certainly encourages the use of review-
assisting products, the quality of returned 
data is dependent on a number of factors, 
including the quality of the original data (is it 
complete, with uncorrupted files), the 
methods the software employs (is it using 
basic, complex or a combination of search 
strategies), and their implementations (is the 
algorithmic interpretation of the search 
function stable and error-free) (Grossman & 
Cormack, 2011).  
2.1 Modern Search Techniques 
Tingen (2012) and the Sedona Conference 
(Baron et al., 2007) catalogue several of the 
most common e-discovery techniques and 
describe how they vary in intended 
application and sophistication (Grossman & 
Cormack, 2011; Tingen, 2012).   
The most basic method is one many 
internet users are familiar with: keyword 
search. A keyword search strategy typically 
involves developing a list of potentially 
relevant terms and phrases, and then 
searching text data for occurrences of those 
words (Tingen, 2012). While its ease of use 
has led to its widespread implementation, not 
all relevant documents necessarily include one 
or more of the keywords searched for. The 
reverse is also true: containing a keyword is 
not a guarantee of a document’s relevance 
(Tingen, 2012). A further complication arises 
from the fact that keyword searches often 
only match exact strings; words with spelling 
errors or inflected words, such as walked 
instead of walk, may not be returned (Tingen, 
2012). 
Utilizing Boolean operators and fuzzy 
search technologies permits more flexibility in 
what is still essentially keyword searching. 
For example, the Boolean operator wildcard, 
often represented as *, indicates to the 
computer that any character may take the 
wildcard’s place and that any pattern match 
should be a returned result (Tingen, 2012).  
Therefore, using a Boolean operator search for 
read* may return documents containing not 
only read, but also reader, reading, and ready 
(Tingen, 2012). Similarly, fuzzy search 
techniques attempt to account for human 
error by weighting letters in a word according 
to their position and allowing for low-weight 
letters to differ (Tingen, 2012). 
Other search tools include ontologies and 
taxonomies, Bayesian classifiers, document 
clustering methods, such as topic modeling, 
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and recently, sentiment analysis (Tingen, 
2012; Baron et al., 2007).  Ontologies and 
taxonomies also serve to expand the 
usefulness of keyword searching, allowing the 
computer to retrieve keyword synonyms 
(Baron et al., 2007; Tingen, 2012). For 
example, if one were to use a taxonomy and 
search for pen, results may include ballpoint, 
rollerball or felt tip. Bayesian classifiers use 
probability algorithms to determine document 
relevance by weighting particular words or 
phrases, taking into account their frequency, 
and also by examining the document’s 
proximity and similarity to others in the set 
(Tingen, 2012). Document clustering involves 
statistically analyzing the words in each 
document in the data set and grouping it with 
others with similar statistical measurements 
(Tingen, 2012). Sentiment analysis involves 
classifying words within a text according to 
their emotional value (Pang & Lee, 2008). 
The measurements of emotion can vary 
greatly; some sentiment classifiers try to 
determine whether or not a given sentence is 
negative or positive by averaging emotion 
scores across all the words in a sentence, while 
others go so far as to classify sentences 
according to the “six “universal” emotions […]: 
anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and 
surprise,” (Pang & Lee, 2008). 
The techniques discussed in the previous 
paragraph possess an advantage over simple 
keyword searches: as discussed by (Baron et 
al., 2007), when used effectively, they can 
reveal unexpected results by identifying 
related concepts that human operators may 
not have associated before. Each of these 
methods is effective at returning some 
proportion of relevant records, but they all 
share a similar limitation. 
2.2 The Limitation of Looking at Words 
As can be seen, all of these techniques rely on 
the presence of words, whether they are the 
particular words being looked for in a 
keyword search, or related concepts being 
united through document clustering. However, 
authors do not always use words in the way 
they were intended (Baron et al., 2007), and 
sometimes, the absence of words is far more 
important than a keyword search may 
indicate.  This is an acknowledged problem in 
the realm of sentiment analysis: developing 
methods for identifying sarcastic text, for 
example, is still a current challenge 
(González-Ibáñez, Muresan, & Wacholder, 
2011). 
Zhou et al. (2003) defines deception as, 
“the active transmission of messages and 
information to create a false conclusion.” The 
authors further specify that there must be an 
intent to deceive; messages that a transmitter 
does not know are false are not considered 
deceptive under this definition (Zhou, 
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 
2003). These messages can deceive in different 
ways. While some involve the transmission of 
misleading information, it is also possible to 
deceive with one’s writing style to hide the 
identity of the author (Afroz, Brennan, & 
Greenstadt, 2012; Brennan, Afroz & 
Greenstadt, 2012; Juola, 2012).  Although the 
transmission of misleading information is the 
focus of this study, stylistic deception will be 
briefly addressed as well (Afroz, Brennan, & 
Greenstadt, 2012; Brennan, Afroz & 
Greenstadt, 2012; Juola, 2012).   
Past studies have shown that during 
deceptive interaction, there are a variety of 
cues which can indicate the deception (Zhou, 
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 
2003). However, due to the relatively recent 
rise in computer-mediated communication 
(CMC), the majority of research identifying 
these deceptive indicators has focused on face-
to-face, human-to-human interaction (Enos, 
Shriberg, Graciarena, Hirschberg & Stolcke, 
2007; Fitzpatrick & Bachenko, 2009; Zhou, 
Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003; Zhou, Twitchell, 
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). Further 
research into linguistic methods of detecting 
deception is needed; due to the fact that 
many of the indicators previously studied, 
such as pupil dilation and pressing lips 
together, are unavailable when the 
interaction’s participants are separated by 
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time, space and technology (Keila & 
Skillicorn, 2005; Lee, Welker, & Odom, 2009; 
Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & 
Nunamaker, 2003). The following section will 
discuss deception in CMC and how it may be 
measured.  
2.3 Linguistic Techniques for Deception 
Detection 
The scope of our search can be broadened by 
examining categories of words rather than just 
words themselves. This section examines 
previous literature on deception, focusing on 
studies centered on CMC, and identifies 
features which will be implemented in the 
model classifier (see section 4).   
2.4 Deception in Explicit Experimental 
Space 
While the literature on deception as a speech 
act is quite rich, deception in CMC is a 
sparsely studied field, in part due to the 
difficulty of collecting authentic data. Lee, 
Welker, and Odom (2009), Hancock, Curry, 
Goorha, and Woodworth (2008) and Zhou, 
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, and Nunamaker 
(2003) together with Zhou, Burgoon, and 
Twitchell (2003) employ similar experimental 
methods, which involve encouraging some 
participants to deceive a randomly assigned, 
anonymous communication partner.  
(Incentivizing experimental participants to 
deceive has also been undertaken in face-to-
face communication studies, such as Enos, 
Shriberg, Graciarena, Hirschberg, and Stolcke 
(2007).) The language used by the deceptive 
and non-deceptive participants was then 
compared in order to identify whether or not 
there were language patterns endemic to 
deception, and if so, what they were 
(Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & Woodworth, 
2008; Lee, Welker, & Odom, 2009; Zhou, 
Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003; Zhou, Twitchell, 
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). In each 
study, students were anonymously paired with 
others, and each of these communication 
dyads was then instructed to communicate 
about some outside entity (Lee, Welker, & 
Odom, 2009; Zhou, Burgoon, & Twitchell, 
2003; Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, & 
Nunamaker, 2003). In Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, 
Burgoon, and Nunamaker (2003) and Zhou, 
Burgoon, and Twitchell (2003), students were 
told to reach agreement on a ranking of items 
which would be most useful in surviving in 
the desert using asynchronic CMC. The other 
study involved one student describing the 
state of real estate properties to an inquiring 
party via a specially-designed email system 
(the other student) (Lee, Welker, & Odom, 
2009). Unlike the others, the Hancock, Curry, 
Goorha, and Woodworth (2008) study 
involved synchronic communication between 
participants through computer terminals; they 
were still deprived of face-to-face interaction, 
but responses were potentially much more 
immediate. 
In all three cases, at least one of each pair 
of students was presented with some level of 
motivation to deceive their partner. However, 
as noted above, these interactions are not 
what one could consider “real-world” as they 
would not have occurred outside the 
experimental sphere. Although the authors 
attempts to mitigate this by informing some 
participants assigned to the deceptive group 
that their partner’s belief was important, 
there was little to no real risk involved with 
being unsuccessful with their deception 
attempts (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, & 
Woodworth, 2008); as Lee, Welker, and Odom 
(2009) note, “The kinds of messages that 
people construct defensively when lying to a 
superior who can exact harm on them may 
differ from the kinds of messages that 
individuals construct when lying to unknown 
students…”   
 The linguistic features examined in the 
articles described thus far varied, but each 
one identified some cues which were 
significantly associated with the act of 
deception. Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, 
and Nunamaker (2003) determined that use of 
ellipsis, wordiness, passive voice, second 
person address and possessive forms were 
significantly indicative. The authors also 
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found that deceptive study participants used 
more words (especially verbs, modifiers and 
noun phrases) and yet also displayed less 
lexical and content diversity (Zhou, Twitchell, 
Qin, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003). Zhou, 
Burgoon, & Twitchell (2003) confirmed the 
significance of these features, but also shed 
light on the importance of chronology in 
deception analysis.  They found that at the 
beginning of a deception, the cues available 
for analysis are “fair [in] number”, and as time 
progresses, they shift in number, increasing 
and then decreasing until the end of the 
communicative event, at which time very few 
cues are exposed; furthermore, not all cues 
were significant over all time periods (Zhou, 
Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003). To mitigate this 
chronological challenge, the authors suggest 
either merging all messages or selecting 
certain messages toward the middle of a 
communicative event for further scrutiny 
(Zhou, Burgoon, & Twitchell, 2003). 
Following this guidance, the model classifier 
proposed in section 4 below functions on a 
merged set which is not chronologically 
separated. 
The increase in wordiness found by Zhou, 
Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, and Nunamaker 
(2003) was corroborated by Hancock, Curry, 
Goorha, and Woodworth (2008). Additionally, 
it was determined that deceptive participants 
used fewer causal words (such as because or 
effect) when lying (Hancock, Curry, Goorha, 
& Woodworth, 2008). Deceptive participants 
were also more likely to use sense-related 
words (see or listen) when they were not 
telling the truth. 
According to Afroz, Brennan and 
Greenstadt (2012), function words are the 
most useful, content-independent features for 
detecting deceptive writing.  Additionally, 
they state that these function word features 
can be used to identify style deceptions; that 
is, although an author can alter their style to 
hide their identity, function words can be 
used to determine that style obfuscation has 
taken place (Afroz, Brennan, and Greenstadt, 
2012).  Juola (2012) also successfully utilized 
character trigrams (series of three characters, 
such as cha or har from character) to detect 
imitation and stylistic obfuscation. 
Lee, Welker, and Odom (2009) elaborated 
on the difference between deceiver and truth-
teller content words, stating that deceivers’ 
messages included more causation words, first-
person singular pronouns, present-tense verbs 
and tenacity verbs. This finding regarding 
first-person singular references is somewhat 
different from one of the findings reported in 
Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, Burgoon, and 
Nunamaker (2003), where the authors found 
that group references were significant, but 
first-person singular references were not. In 
comparison, Hancock, Curry, Goorha, and 
Woodworth (2008) found that first-person 
references fell in number during deceptive 
communication. In light of the disagreement, 
the model classifier (see section 4) will 
examine these features (first-person singular 
and first-person plural references) separately. 
It is possible these observed differences may 
be due to the context of the conversation: for 
example, when discussing desert survival such 
as in the Lee, Welker, and Odom (2009) 
study, it may be more prudent to refer to the 
survival of the group rather than oneself.   
2.5 Deception in Real-World Data 
While these findings are an excellent place of 
departure, it is also important to verify their 
findings with research on real-world data, if 
and when available (Feng, Banerjee & Choi, 
2012; Fitzpatrick & Bachenko, 2009; Lee, 
Welker, & Odom, 2009; Zhou, Burgoon, & 
Twitchell, 2003; Zhou, Twitchell, Qin, 
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2003).  Any data not 
produced as the prompting of a study could 
be considered real-world; for example, Feng, 
Banerjee and Choi (2012) use reviews 
collected from several review websites while 
Fitzpatrick and Bachenko (2009) collect both 
spoken and written narratives from sources 
such as Court TV and police case files. 
The Enron Email Data Set is a large 
collection of real world emails released to the 
public domain. It is comprised of the mail 
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folders of 150 former Enron employees, 
including some of the top executives who were 
later prosecuted, some of whom were 
convicted of deception based crimes (EDRM, 
LLC, 2014). What is important is that the 
data were not motivated by a study, and it is 
reasonable to assume that some of the emails 
within the set contain evidence of deception 
(Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). 
Keila and Skillicorn (2005) examine the 
Enron Email Data Set in detail. The authors 
built a classifier which ranked emails by the 
likelihood that they contained deception based 
on the measurement of a variety of linguistic 
features (Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). This 
approach, in essence, identifies emails which 
deviate most from a model of language, rather 
than trying to predict whether each individual 
text is deceptive (Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). 
Although the authors’ tool does not 
discriminate the identities of senders or 
receivers of email, they state that their 
approach can also be applied successfully to 
the emails of a single person to identify their 
most unusual messages (Keila & Skillicorn, 
2005).   
Gupta (2007) proposes the use of the 
Pennebaker deception model to find deceptive 
emails within the Enron Email Data Set 
(EDRM, LLC, 2014). The applied model relies 
on changing frequencies of personal pronouns, 
exclusive words, negative-emotion words and 
action words (Gupta, 2007).  However, the 
sparsity of the created model (due to the lack 
of most words not occurring in most of the 
texts) results in the need for specialized 
normalization procedures to prevent zero 
values from unduly influencing the model 
(Gupta, 2007). While Gupta (2007) suggests 
that deception word features can be 
customized to suit any domain, the danger of 
data sparsity remains. It also does not take 
into account syntax (such as the noun drive 
as compared with the verb drive), context or 
literary devices, which can all affect the 
meaning of a used word in a text (Gupta, 
2007). 
Louwerse, Lin, Drescher, and Semin 
(2010) follow in the footsteps of Keila and 
Skillicorn (2005) and Gupta (2007) and 
examine the Enron Email Data Set (EDRM, 
LLC, 2014). Using linguistic categories and 
several derived features, they analyze the data 
set to determine if certain features could be 
linked to fraudulent events (Louwerse, Lin, 
Drescher, & Semin, 2010; EDRM, LLC, 2014). 
They conclude that abstractness (which was 
calculated using a formula to compare usage 
of verbs and adjectives) is most indicative of 
fraudulent events in the corpus (Louwerse, 
Lin, Drescher, & Semin, 2010). However, they 
qualify their findings by stating, “By no 
means are we arguing that by using the LCM 
model we can predict whether an email 
consists of fraudulent information or not,” 
(Louwerse, Lin, Drescher, & Semin, 2010). 
A similar model to the one proposed in 
this paper was reported by Feng, Banerjee 
and Choi (2012). The authors built a classifier 
which utilized both lexical and syntactic rule 
features to uncover deception in several 
different corpora of reviews (Feng, Banerjee & 
Choi, 2012). However, this requires a deep 
syntactic parser for the language being 
studied, which may not available and may 
have varying accuracy rates (Feng, Banerjee 
& Choi, 2012). Their process also relies on 
lexical features, which they state have been 
identified as useful within a specific genre, 
such as reviews (Feng, Banerjee & Choi, 
2012).   
3.  MODEL 
In this section, two methods of modeling and 
identifying unusual texts within a single 
author’s texts will be outlined, along with 
their results.  Both models will rely on the 
same set of generalized linguistic as opposed 
to lexical features; this avoids overfitting the 
models to specific lexical items as seen in 
Gupta (2007). Although Feng, Banerjee and 
Choi (2012) identify that word-based features 
can be useful in genre-specific deception 
detection, the current study does not employ 
them. This is because the genres of emails 
included cannot be guaranteed, and this 
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model is intended to be run over potentially 
genre-mixed data; for example, some emails 
may be formal business electronic letters, 
while others may be very personal and 
informal, incorporating conventions such as 
emoticons and numeric substitutions.   
3.1 Data Set 
Both classification methods were run on a 
portion of the Enron Email Data Set, due to 
the fact that it is publicly available and is 
comprised of real-world data (EDRM, LLC, 
2014; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005). As discussed 
previously, this model seeks to find interesting 
records within a specific author’s work (as 
opposed to drawing comparisons across a 
population) and demonstrate the value of 
linguistic feature-based email ranking as an 
investigative tool. Fornaciari and Poesio 
(2012) conclude from their study of deception 
in court transcripts that, “increasing 
homogeneity [of subsets] is effective provided 
that the remaining set is still sufficiently 
large.” Therefore, the data set is composed of 
emails sent or drafted by one author within 
the Enron Email Data Set, who will be 
unnamed in the interest of privacy (EDRM, 
LLC, 2014). The data set for the present 
experiment was built by exporting the 
mailbox of this single author from the full 
collection, and then removing all messages not 
written by him; for example, all emails 
received were removed, as were forwarded 
portions of those he sent. As he was one of 
the first Enron executives prosecuted, it is 
reasonable to assume that his emails may 
contain items of interest, although they may 
not necessarily be deceptive (Keila & 
Skillicorn, 2005). It is important to note that 
although no definitive identification of 
deceptive emails is possible, as no ground-
truth is available, the purpose of the model is 
to identify potentially relevant or interesting 
documents which may be unresponsive to 
topic searching or predictive coding 
techniques.   
3.2 Methods 
To begin, a list of relevant features, derived 
from those identified in the deception 
detection literature, was assembled.  Other 
features were then added to create a more 
robust language model for each email, and the 
complete list of features can be seen in Table 
1 below (EDRM, LLC, 2014). For each of the 
part of speech and word count features, emails 
were first split into sentences using the 
Natural Language Toolkit sentence tokenize 
function (Bird, Loper, & Klein, 2009).  Each 
sentence was then tokenized on the word level 
and passed through the Penn Treebank part 
of speech tagger (Bird, Loper, & Klein, 2009). 
Frequencies for relevant part of speech tags 
were calculated within each sentence, and 
some tag values were condensed; for example, 
one condensed tag set is comprised of nouns 
and noun phrases, as lexical diversity was the 
feature of interest, not types of noun phrases. 
Finally, these tag-per-sentence frequency 
values are averaged across the sentences 
within the email to form the email-level 
feature.   
Two analytic methods for reviewing the 
emails were then employed. First, WEKA, a 
tool comprised of machine-learning algorithms 
published originally by Hall et al. (2009), was 
used to create a cluster-based classification. 
The mean feature values for each cluster were 
then examined to identify which had higher 
means for parts of the speech associated with 
deception. The goal of employing this method 
was to identify groups of emails with similar 
patterns of language variation, on the basis 
that the most interesting clusters could then 
be extracted for analysis. 
The second method involved calculating 
the mean values for each feature in isolation, 
identifying what emails had statistically 
significant differences for deception-relevant 
features, and subjecting these to human 
review. 
For comparison, a list of keyword terms 
were put together and run on the data set as 
well. As discussed in section 2.1 above, there 
are many “predictive coding” tools available 
on the software market (Grossman & 
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Cormack, 2011). It is my assumption that the 
results obtained from one tool’s use may be 
very different from another. As it is not the 
goal of this paper to judge the efficiency of 
particular industry tools, I have chosen to 
employ a traditional keyword and Boolean 
operator search of the data using Python. In 
order to facilitate this, emails were converted 
to plain text. 
3.3 The Five Clusters 
The WEKA Expectation Maximum (EM) 
algorithm was used to identify clusters within 
the created feature matrix (Hall et al., 2009). 
The algorithm was analyzed with 10-fold cross 
validation, and was set to generate its own 
number of clusters (Hall et al., 2009). The 
table below outlines the clusters built by 
WEKA. The mean values for each feature, as 
well as their standard deviations, are 
included. It is important to note that the 
third singular feature includes words for third 
singular subjects and objects, as well as 
possessive pronouns. First person pronouns 
were not weighted in the clustering algorithm, 
because of the conflicting results from 
previous works as discussed in 2.4 above, and 
were therefore not reported. 
As can be seen, a variety of features were 
examined, not only those previously 
determined as significant with regard to 
deception detection. As discussed briefly 
above, this was done in order to give a more 
thorough outline of the style of each email.  
Furthermore, the additional features may 
reveal other potentially interesting features, 
and they contribute to an analysis of lexical 
diversity. As discussed above, lower lexical 
diversity occurs with a lower frequency of 
content words. This study assessed this by 
taking into account the frequency of the 
remaining weighted word types, including 
repeated and unique nouns, adjectives and 
adverbs.  
Table 1 summarizes the features utilized in the cluster-based classifier. Mean values for each 
feature’s frequency, as calculated across a cluster, are in standard font while standard deviations 
are in italics. 
Feature Cluster 1 
(74) 
Cluster 2 
(35) 
Cluster 3 
(137) 
Cluster 4 
(74) 
Cluster 5 
(85) 
      Metadata      
Subject length 19.8934   
13.2477 
20.2261 
11.8727 
17.1884   
8.7631 
21.3642 
11.9969 
22.5450 
10.3724 
Email length 1.0148    
0.1209 
4.3292    
2.2240 
7.5018   
4.6405 
3.5584    
2.8894 
10.4032 
7.3635 
Emoticons 0.0540    
0.2794 
0             
0.1252 
0.0237    
0.0779 
0.0007    
0.0089 
0 
0.0001 
Raw punctuation 3.3141  
20.8164 
1.6032   
0.7167 
1.6197      
0.7265 
1.4976    
1.6505 
1.7495 
0.5947 
‘@’ or ‘#’ 0             
0.0454 
0.0303      
0.0997 
0    0.0002 0             
0.0454 
0.0156 
0.0541 
Grammatical           
features 
    
Modal verbs 0             
0.0041 
0.0090      
0.0057 
0.0031    
0.0028 
0.0008    
0.0016 
0.0041 
0.0031 
Prepositions 0.0001    
0.0008 
0.0167    
0.0092 
0.0148    
0.0075 
0.0139    
0.0107 
0.0178 
0.0053 
Coordinators 0.0001    
0.0006 
0.0039    
0.0034 
0.0046    
0.0037 
0.0008    
0.0016 
0.0039 
0.0027 
Determiners 0             
0 
0.0116    
0.0061 
0.0156    
0.0072 
0.0143    
0.0103 
0.0153 
0.0056 
Adjectives 0.0021    
0.0067 
0.0049    
0.0046 
0.0092    
0.0076 
0.0060    
0.0090 
0.0071 
0.0043 
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Feature Cluster 1 
(74) 
Cluster 2 
(35) 
Cluster 3 
(137) 
Cluster 4 
(74) 
Cluster 5 
(85) 
Adverbs 0.0011    
0.0066 
0.0039    
0.0040 
0.0062    
0.0063 
0.0053    
0.0086 
0.0072 
0.0061 
‘To’ 0             
0 
0.0028    
0.0031 
0.0057    
0.0049 
0.0031    
0.0043 
0.0050 
0.0033 
      Pronouns      
2nd  0.0009    
0.0073 
0.0029    
0.0044 
0.0047    
0.0060 
0.0015    
0.0030 
0.0023 
0.0027 
2nd possessive 0             
0.0015 
0.0001    
0.0005 
0.0010    
0.0021 
0.0006    
0.0018 
0.0007 
0.0015 
3rd sg. 0             
0.0026 
0.0006    
0.0019 
0.0003    
0.0009 
0.0012    
0.0039 
0.0008 
0.0018 
3rd pl. 0             
0.0010 
0    0.0003 0     
0 
0             
0.0010 
0.0019 
0.0016 
3rd pl. possessive 0             
0.0005 
0             
0.0005 
0.0001    
0.0003 
0             
0.0005 
0.0006 
0.0011 
      Verb types      
Base 0             
0.0001 
0.0125    
0.0064 
0.0090    
0.0065 
0.0042    
0.0058 
0.0082 
0.0046 
Present tense 0.0001    
0.0011 
0.0091    
0.0067 
0.0190    
0.0095 
0.0150    
0.0124 
0.0165 
0.0066 
Past tense 0             
0 
0.0029    
0.0035 
0.0065    
0.0049 
0.0071    
0.0082 
0.0079 
0.0049 
      Nouns      
Repeated nouns 0.0015   
0.0081 
0.0006    
0.0012 
0.0001    
0.0003 
0.0004   
0.0016 
0.0007 
0.0009 
Unique nouns 0.0235   
0.0533 
0.0811    
0.0234 
0.0653    
0.0209 
0.0870   
0.0314 
0.0601 
0.0135 
      Wh- words      
No pronouns 0.0002   
0.0020 
0.0005   
0.0014 
0.0022    
0.0039 
0.0004   
0.0013 
0.0014 
0.0022 
Wh- pronouns 0            
0.0021 
0.0001   
0.0005 
0.0025    
0.0038 
0.0004   
0.0010 
0.0013 
0.0027 
Cluster 2 is the most interesting of the 
clusters above, for several reasons. It has high 
frequencies of modal, base and present tense 
verbs, medium to high frequencies of second 
person pronouns and high frequencies of 
function words (most notably, prepositions 
and coordinators). This is combined with 
medium to very low frequencies of unique and 
repeated nouns (although the means are 
relatively high, the standard deviation is as 
well), medium to low frequencies of adjectives 
and adverbs, and medium to long email 
bodies, this cluster is a candidate for human 
review. Cluster 5 too has high frequencies of 
these features, and given the small numbers of 
emails placed into these clusters (120), human 
review for both is plausible, although this may 
not always be the case.   
3.4 Individual Feature Analysis 
Table 2, which summarizes the results of the 
second method discussed in 4.2 above, can be 
found below.  Mean values for each feature 
were calculated across the entire data set. The 
statistical significance values are standard 
deviations from the mean. The final column is 
the number of emails with values which are 
statistically significant in the direction under 
scrutiny; that is, higher frequencies of features 
are more important. Even in the case of 
lexical diversity this is true, because the 
model should not be drawing attention to 
emails with high unique content. 
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Table 2 shows the features examined, their corpus-wide means and standard deviations. The 
final column identifies the number of emails in the corpus with significant values for each 
feature. 
Feature Mean value Standard
deviation 
Number of emails 
with significant 
values (out of 405) 
      Metadata 
Subject length 20.50617 11.67137 75
Email length 4.935802 5.053753 55
Emoticons 0.0136596 0.1252213 7
Raw punctuation 1.905513 9.005654 5
‘@’ or ‘#’ 0.0070054 0.0454155 13
      Grammatical features
Modal verbs 0.0027279 0.0041302 60
Prepositions 0.0125777 0.0101776 64
Coordinators 0.0021978 0.0030283 69
Determiners 0.0116533 0.0093803 60
Adjectives 0.0057991 0.0075239 52
Adverbs 0.0047896 0.0072721 45
‘To’ 0.0031837 0.0040969 71
      Pronouns 
1st sg.  0.0044918 0.0061031 27
1st sg. possessive 0.0002954 0.0013422 23
1st pl.  0.00092 0.002454 36
1st pl. possessive 0.000301 0.001155 28
2nd  0.0021805 0.0048731 39
3rd sg. 0.0006766 0.0026263 28
3rd pl. 0.0003241 0.0009732 43
3rd pl. possessive 0.0001186 0.0005079 25
      Verb 
types 
Base 0.006042 0.0066367 79
Present tense 0.0122779 0.0111024 61
Past tense 0.0052184 0.0064449 54
      Nouns 
Repeated nouns 0.0006551 0.0036768 10
Unique nouns 0.0668139 0.0396788 55
      Wh- words 
No pronouns 0.0008137 0.002271 37
Wh- pronouns 0.0006929 0.0021356 35
 
As can be seen, there are fewer emails 
found significant on this per-feature basis (the 
maximum of which was 79) than those 
identified in clusters 2 and 5 (n=120). This is 
likely because of the flexibility of the 
clustering algorithm and weighting system.  
Not every email in the relevant clusters had 
significant values for every feature; they 
simply had a high enough proportion of 
significant features as to pattern together. 
3.5 Analysis 
Overall, these two methods pointed to similar 
potentially-deviant collection subsets, with the 
latter suggesting fewer in total. Although this 
second, smaller subset returned more precise 
results, its recall may be too low and the 
cluster model may be more fitting for smaller 
data sets more suited to human review. The 
smaller subset is problematic for the collection 
size being tested (about 400 emails in total 
from the author in question) in this instance, 
because its overlap with keyword search is 
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fairly large (for example, 22 of the 41 emails 
which had statistically significant modal and 
base verb features were also returned by 
keyword searching).   
The emails in clusters 2 and 5 contained 
more disparate data, including a number of 
personal contacts (discussing topics such as 
golf plans and his job dissatisfaction) and 
business related emails in a more informal 
linguistic style (discussing and justifying 
several notable business practices which he 
was later prosecuted for) that were not 
identified by keyword search.   
One interesting pattern which emerged 
was that a few of his emails in cluster 5, 
especially those in a more informal style, 
contained descriptions and unflattering 
characterizations of those involved in business 
situations he disagreed with, along with 
information about what those situations were 
in general terms.  While these records are 
undoubtedly relevant (both from an e-
discovery and investigative perspective), he 
does not refer to the people he is describing 
by name; sometimes he does not even refer to 
them by the company they work for. This, 
combined with a general vagueness, lack of 
nouns he usually associates with his workplace 
and no use of notable keywords resulted in 
some of these emails not being returned by 
keyword searching.  Additional emails in this 
style were returned by searching some of the 
most general keywords (such as trade and 
trading), although any more sophisticated 
filtering mechanism, such as requiring more 
than one keyword, would have eliminated the 
record as irrelevant.   
It is important to note that both of these 
methods in essence divide texts by their 
writing style, and then select subsets based on 
the concentration of frequencies of deception-
associated features.  Brennan, Afroz and 
Greenstadt (2012) demonstrated that it may 
be possible for authors to obfuscate their 
writing style purposefully. While Brennan, 
Afroz and Greenstadt (2012) focuses on 
concealing an author’s identity, the ability for 
participants to confuse stylometric tools by 
attempting to write differently suggests that 
it may be possible to consciously alter one’s 
writing style to change the distribution of 
certain features. These stylistic 
countermeasures may be detectable, however 
(Afroz, Brennan, & Greenstadt, 2012; Juola, 
2012). 
4.  CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated, linguistic methods for 
deception detection can contribute to e-
discovery search by stratifying the data and 
highlighting records which may otherwise go 
undetected during a search phase.  Although 
this classifier method does not replace current 
search technologies and some results may be 
overlapping, it can be effectively utilized 
alongside them to bring attention to unusual 
and interesting emails. Further investigation 
is needed to determine what search methods 
best compliment the proposed model. 
Additional verification is also recommended, 
preferably with a data set in which deceptive 
texts are identified, so that empirical, ground-
truthed testing may be undertaken. Research 
into the ability of an author to purposefully 
conceal deceptive indicators would also be 
highly recommended. 
REFERENCES 
Afroz, S., Brennan, M., & Greenstadt, R. 
(2012). Detecting hoaxes, frauds, and 
deception in writing style online. In 2012 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 
(SP), 461-475. 
Baron, J. R., Braman, R., Withers, K., 
Allman, T., Daley, M., & Paul, G. (2007). 
The Sedona Conference® Best Practices 
Commentary on the Use of Search and 
Information Retrieval Methods in e-
Discovery. The Sedona Conference 
Journal, 8, 189-223. 
Belt, W., Kiker, D., & Shetterly, D. (2012). 
Technology-assisted document review: Is it 
defensible? Richmond Journal of Law and 
Technology, XVIII(3), 1-43. 
JDFSL V9N2 “Time for Some Traffic Problems…” 
Page 178  © 2014 ADFSL 
Bird, S., Loper, E., & Klein, E. (2009). 
Natural Language Processing with Python, 
O’Reilly Media Inc. 
Brennan, M., Afroz, S., & Greenstadt, R. 
(2012). Adversarial stylometry: 
Circumventing authorship recognition to 
preserve privacy and anonymity. ACM 
Transactions on Information and System 
Security (TISSEC), 15(3), 12:1-12:22. 
EDRM, LLC (2014). Enron Email Data Set 
v2. Retrieved from 
http://www.edrm.net/resources/data-
sets/edrm-enron-email-data-set 
Enos, F., Shriberg, E., Graciarena, M., 
Hirschberg, J., & Stolcke, A. (2007). 
Detecting deception using critical 
segments.  INTERSPEECH, 2281-2284. 
Feng, S., Banerjee, R., & Choi, Y. (2012).  
Syntactic stylometry for deception 
detection. Proceedings of the 50th Annual 
Meeting of the Association for 
Computational Linguistics: Short Papers, 
2, 171-175. Association for Computational 
Linguistics. 
Fitzpatrick, E. & Bachenko, J. (2009). 
Building a forensic corpus to test 
language-based indicators of deception. 
Language and Computers, 71(1), 183-196. 
Fornaciari, T., & Poesio, M. (2012). On the 
use of homogenous sets of subjects in 
deceptive language analysis. Proceedings 
of the Workshop on Computational 
Approaches to Deception Detection, 39-47. 
Association for Computational Linguistics. 
González-Ibáñez, R., Muresan, S., & 
Wacholder, N. (2011). Identifying sarcasm 
in Twitter: A closer look. Proceedings of 
the 49th Annual Meeting of the 
Association for Computational Linguistics, 
581–586. 
Grossman, M., & Cormack, G. (2011). 
Technology-Assisted review in e-Discovery 
can be more effective and more efficient 
than exhaustive manual review. Richmond 
Journal of Law and Technology, XVII(3), 
1-33. 
Gupta, S. (2007).  Modelling Deception 
Detection in Text (Master’s thesis). 
Retrieved from 
http://qspace.library.queensu.ca/handle/1
974/922  
Hall, M., Frank, E., Holmes, G., Pfahringer, 
B., Reutemann, P., & Witten, I. (2009). 
The WEKA data mining software: An 
update. SIGKDD Explorations, 11(1), 10-
18. 
Hancock, J., Curry, L., Goorha, S., & 
Woodworth, M. (2008). On lying and 
being lied to: A linguistic analysis of 
deception in computer-mediated 
communication. Discourse Processes, 
45(1), 1-23. 
Juola, P. (2012). Detecting stylistic deception. 
In Proceedings of the Workshop on 
Computational Approaches to Deception 
Detection, 91-96. Association for 
Computational Linguistics. 
Keila, P., & Skillicorn, D. (2005). Detecting 
Unusual and Deceptive Communication in 
Email. Technical report. 
Kroll Ontrack (2013). 5 Daunting Problems 
Facing EDiscovery: Insights on 
EDiscovery Challenges in the Legal 
Technologies Market. Technical report. 
Retrieved from  
http://www.krollontrack.com  
Lee, C., Welker, R., & Odom, M. (2009). 
Features of computer-mediated, text-based 
messages that support automatable, 
linguistics-based indicators for deception 
detection. Journal of Information Systems, 
23(1), 5-24. 
Louwerse, M., Lin, K. I., Drescher, A., & 
Semin, G. (2010). Linguistic cues predict 
fraudulent events in a corporate social 
network. Proceedings of the 32nd Annual 
Conference of the Cognitive Science 
Society, 961-966. 
Oard, D., & Webber, W. (2013). Information 
retrieval for E-Discovery. Foundations and 
Trends in Information Retrieval, 7(2-3), 
99-237. 
“Time for Some Traffic Problems” … JDFSL V9N2 
© 2014 ADFSL  Page 179 
Pang, B., & Lee, L. (2008). Opinion mining 
and Sentiment Analysis.  Foundations and 
Trends in Information Retrieval, 2(1-2), 
1-135. 
Tingen, J. (2012). Technologies-that-must-
not-be-named: Understanding and 
implementing advanced search 
technologies in E-Discovery.  Richmond 
Journal of Law and Technology, XIX(1), 
1-49. 
Zhou, L., Burgoon, J., & Twitchell, D. (2003). 
A longitudinal analysis of language 
behavior of deception in e-mail.  In Chen, 
H. Miranda, R., Zeng, D., Demchak, C., 
Schroeder, J., Madhusudan, T. (eds). 
Intelligence and Security Informatics, 
LNCS 2665, 102-110. Springer Verlag, 
Berlin Heidelberg. 
Zhou, L., Twitchell, D., Qin, T., Burgoon, J., 
& Nunamaker, J. (2003). An exploratory 
study into deception detection in text-
based computer-mediated communication.  
Proceedings of the 36th Hawaii 
International Conference on System 
Sciences, 1-10. 
  
JDFSL V9N2 “Time for Some Traffic Problems…” 
Page 180  © 2014 ADFSL 
  
